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Summary  findings
Total  factor  productivity  has been low  in most  of Sub-  technology  - local skills could  contribute  significantly
Saharan Africa. It is often said that the binding constraint  more in raising output.
on African industrial development is the inadequate  The experience of other countries also suggests that as
supply of technologically capable workers. And many  the economy opens to flows of international knowledge
cross-country studies imply that the low level of human  - whether through technology transfers or through
capital in Africa is an important source of low growth in  informal transfers from purchasers of exports - the
per capita income.  technological capacity of local industry becomes
The results of Pack and Paxson's study do not  important.
necessarily conflict with this view. They indicate that in  The policy implications of this analysis are clear:
noncompetitive industrial sectors with little inflow of  Without the prospect of a more competitive
new technology, the contribution of technological  environment, continued  efforts to develop high-level
abilities, however it is measured, is limited.  industrial skills may be wasteful. But the absence of such
If liberalization of the economy generated greater  skills may limit the benefits to the industrial sector from
competition, or if export growth were accelerated - future liberalization, as a result of which the supply
permitting the import of inputs embodying new  response to improved incentives may be weak.
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In  most  of  the  Sub-Saharan African economies neither  the  levels  of  total  factor
productivity (TFP), nor the growth rates of TFP in manufacturing  have been high. All
studies of cross-country  performance  find that the Sub-Saharan  African economies  are the
largest bloc of nations that have not converged on  the United States. Most of  the
intercountry  explanations  have focused  on easily measured  aggregate  variables  such as the
ratio of investment to GDP, education  levels, and in some models, proxies for political
stability (Barro and Lee 1993 and Easterly  1993).  These models  have as their underlying
theoretical framework a view that the national economy can be modeled with a set of
multiplicative  inputs-an  increase  in the right-hand  side variables such as the investment
rate  or  education level will produce an  increase in  growth rates. However, as  is
increasingly  recognized,  including  many authors of papers on convergence,  the particular
specification  of the implied  production  function  is open to question  and the right-hand  side
variables may themselves  be endogenous.  Moreover,  in the case of the African nations,
close observers  question whether a simple increase in investment  rates will generate the
impact implied by  the  cross country regressions-many  countries have experienced
growing  marginal  capital-output  ratios  over the last two decades  (Husain 1993).
There are two divergent though complementary  views of the lack of productivity
growth in Sub-Saharan  Africa.! The first holds that pervasive government  intervention
imposes  large costs on individual  firms  and reduces  incentives  to become  efficient  (Collier
and Gunning 1999).  It is not only protection  from foreign  competition  that has such effects
but also problems  stemming  from  bad macroeconomic  policies  such as highly variable  real
exchange  rates which  make long-term  planning  difficult  for firms.  A second interpretation
focuses on the paucity of technological  competence  as measured by the small supply of
2 trained managers  and engineers. This paper examines  the determinants  of manufacturing
productivity  and the role of education  and technology  variables  at the level of individual
firms. A major implication of our results is that, ceteris paribus, it is unlikely that an
increase in education levels will have much impact on manufacturing  TFP levels. We
suggest a more complex  view of the role of education,  emphasizing  that in the absence of
technology  inflows,  higher  skills  may have  very low  productivity.
Using the results of surveys  of industrial firms in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe,
we consider the connection  between technological  abilities and productivity  in the three
nations. Section 2 sets out the determinants  of productivity. Section 3 provides some
aggregate measures of factors that may affect productivity in  the three economies in
question. Section 4 presents empirical results for the analysis of the determinants of
productivity in  a  large group of  firms in  the  three countries. Section 5  offers an
interpretation  of the results. Section  6 concludes.
l Meier and Steel  (1989)  contains  a good selection  of representative  views.
2 For a general  discussion  of the technological  requirements  for industrial  development  see Lall
(1990).  Pack  (1993)  provides  an overview  of industrial  development  in Africa  and  extensive  references  to the
literature.
I2.  The Determinants of Productivity Levels
While economy-wide  and sectoral  shortages  of human capital are widely assumed
to limit efficient industrial  development,  there is little empirical evidence  on whether this
is indeed the case in individual  African firms. The presence of trained and experienced
managers  and workers does not guarantee  high firmn  productivity  for several  reasons. First,
individuals with formal credentials may not possess the cognitive skills necessary to
improve TFP. Second, if there is limited rivalry, firms may view investment in cost-
reducing efforts as  not being necessary to  remain competitive. Third,  an industry's
organization  such as vertical  integration  between  manufacturers  and retailers  may result in
low productivity if, for example, each firm produces a large range of products, the
profitability of firms being guaranteed  by protection from imported goods. Hence, the
frequently  drawn  policy conclusion  of the need for higher levels of education  and training
based on the assumed  shortages  of skilled  manpower  may be unwarranted.
In theory technological  abilities  are important  for cost reduction  in industrial  firms,
facilitating learning-by-doing. The simplest interpretation of  pure  learning-by-doing
envisions a manual worker tightening  a bolt in forty percent less time the hundredth  time
she does it as compared  to the first time. But a complete  specification  of "pure"  learning  by
doing  would  recognize  that there is usually  an ongoing  reorganization  of the flow of work,
the design or distribution  of improved  machinery,  and additional  training. Thus, even in
the simplest case of  learning-by-doing,  one would expect that the presence of  more
educated  or trained supervisors  and production  workers  will facilitate  realization  of greater
TFP growth. However, there is little empirical support even in industrialized  countries
establishing a  close relation between technological abilities and  cost  reduction for
industrial  firms. 3
By itself, the purchase  of modem equipment  does  not guarantee  that high TFP will
be realized with such machinery-many  complementary  firm-level actions are required.
Production  engineering  must be mastered,  the flow of intermediate  inputs to the plant and
spare  parts must be arranged,  workers  must be trained,  and marketing  must be enhanced  so
that it is not necessary  to produce short  production  runs to order  and incur excessive  set up
costs.  Education,  vocational  training,  foreign  training,  firm-level  research  and
development,  expenditures  on technology  licenses,  and the nationality  of owners may all
affect the ability of firms to master the software of technology and are thus important
determinants  of firm-level  productivity.
The economic  environment  established  by macro- and microeconomic  policies  will
also impinge  on the firm and discourage  or partly offset positive efforts at the firm level.
Difficulty in obtaining raw and intermediate  inputs of a given quality due to exchange
controls, erratic supply of public services such as electricity,  the incentive provided by
import restrictions  to expand the range of products,  and the general absence of incentives
to improve productivity  all affect firm-level  performance.  For any given set of firms the
impact  of the economic  environment  and firm-level  factors  jointly determine  productivity.
3For  studies  demonstrating  the interaction  of education  and technological  change in agriculture  see
Welch  (1970),  Rosenzweig  (1995),  Foster,  Rosenzweig,  et al. (1995),  and  Foster  and Rosenzweig  (1995).
2Assuming that all firms within a given industry face the same economic environment, it is
possible  to test whether firm technological abilities affect TFP or its mirror image, unit
costs.
There  are  two  alternate views  of  the role  of  education  and  technology  in  the
production function. The first views them as multiplicative inputs in a standard production
function. Thus, if a production function is estimated, elasticities of output with respect to
technology inputs can be calculated. A second view that we believe is more useful (Nelson
and Phelps  1966) argues that education will have its greatest impact when there is rapid
technological  change.  If  the  basic  technology  (a  loom  used  in  weaving)  is  largely
unchanged over time, the production process becomes routine and the ability to deal with
change  is not  germane  - high  education results  in  only  limited productivity  gains.  In
contrast,  where  technology  is  rapidly  evolving,  learning  about  the  existence  of  new
processes,  learning  to  use  them when  they are  deployed,  and  staying  abreast of  new
developments requires the adaptability provided by formal education.
The preceding can be formalized following a model of Nelson and Phelps (1966).
Firms in developing countries (DCs) operate with a technology level equal to A(t) in period
t. Their peers in industrial countries (IC) operate technology T(t). The rate at which the IC
technology is introduced into the DC depends on the level of human capital, h, and is
(1)  A'(t) / A (t) = a (h) [  A) (t)
The extent to which local DC technology improves is a positive function, a'(h) > 0
of the level of human capital and proportional to the magnitude of the differential between
current  and  "best  practice"  technology.  As  the  technology  T(t) does  not  have  to  be
invented, the potential productivity gain from the transfer of this technology is the benefit
of relative backwardness (Gerschenkron 1962). Assume that the IC technology improves
each year by  p percent so that
(2)  T(t) = T-e  .
Given  (1) and (2), the underlying differential equation implies  that the potential
equilibrium path of technology of a DC firm is
(3)  A(t) = [a(h) /(a(h) + (p)]TOe-
The potential level of technology realized by an DC firm at a moment in time will
thus be higher: (1) the greater its ability to deal with new technologies as a result of the
presence of qualified individuals on its staff; (2) the larger the inflow of technology to the
firm in the form of new equipment, new material inputs, new knowledge obtained from
consultants, licensors, and foreign owners. The potential level of technology characterizing
a firm will evolve along (3) and depends solely its own level of h and the rate of technical
progress in the ICs that becomes available to the DC firm. If foreign exchange shortages or
arbitrary rules prohibiting  some forms of technology  imports reduce the inflow of new
knowledge, the benefit  conferred by h is reduced. This  might stem, for example, from
3regulations that limit expenditures on technology licensing payments so that a firm cannot
purchase a potentially useful technology, implying that  (PF<(P where (PF  represents the
lower rate of technology inflow. Thus (3) can be rewritten as
(4)  .(t)  = [a(h) /(a(t) + pF  )]Toe`.
Equation (4) underlines the fact that, at a given point in time, the level of productivity A(t)
for a  given firm may be weakly  associated with h  unless firms'  ability to  obtain new
technology  varies systematically with h.  Unlike formulations which  treat education or
purchases of knowledge as conventional inputs in the production function,  (4) implies that
human capital will have no effect on the level of output obtained with conventional inputs
unless (PF>O  which can only occur if new productive inputs are introduced.
Schultz (1975) argued that in  addition to  the ability to  absorb new  technology,
education  would  be  important if  there  were  a  changing  sectoral  structure  or  internal
product mix of firms, more highly educated workers being better at reallocating factors,
exploring new profitable opportunities, and securing markets. Changing sectoral structure
and internal product mix in turn reflect growth in per capita income in the internal market
combined  with  different  Engel  elasticities  and  changes  in  the  net  trade  balance  in
individual commodities. If sectors are not changing, it is likely that product mix within a
sector is also stable, putting little premium on the ability to cope with change.
3.  Aggregate Evidence on Technology
The payoff to education depends in the above view on two measurable magnitudes:
(1) the inflow of imported machinery and industrial intermediate inputs that may embody
new technology and (2) the sectoral structure of production. To measure the first Table I
shows the rate of growth of all imports of goods and services, in constant prices, for the
three African countries as well as the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, two Asian countries
that are widely viewed as having benefited from the inflow of technology. The second is
measured by the change in the split between light and heavy industry  and the standard
deviation of the percentage change in sectoral shares of value added. 4
In the period 1980-93,  the three African economies exhibited a negative or very
slow growth of  all imports, reflecting their  inability to  earn foreign exchange  through
exporting and the limited inflow of concessional aid. Kenya, for example, experienced a
decline in constant price imports of 0.8 percent per year over the period. As the share of
machinery and transport equipment and other manufactured inputs  in total  imports was
roughly constant over the 1985-93 period, the absolute level of imports that could embody
new technology declined. 5 In Ghana and Zimbabwe there were significant declines in the
4 An alternate measure is provided by Szirmai and Tinumer (1997) which measures the similarity of
the two value added structures. Calculations using their method provide roughly similar qualitative results.
The measures  described in  the text  and  shown  in Table  1 could be  improved.  For  example,
standard intemational trade data contained in the U.N.  Yearbook of International Trade Statistics  allows a
4Table 1. Imports of Goods Embodying New Technology
Share  of machinery  and
Growth  rate of  transport  equipment  in total  Share of other  manufactured
Countiy  imports  imports  imports  in total imports
1980-93  1985  1993  1985  1993
Kenya  -0.8  23  25  28  29
Ghana  2.7  40  26  28  31
Zimbabwe  0.2  65  36  26  31
Korea  11.4  34  34  23  29
Malaysia  9.7  46  54  28  30
Source: World  Development  Report,  various  issues.
share of imported equipment with only slight growth of exports, thus a significant decline
in the level of imported capital goods occurred. The figures also suggest that, at most,  a
modest increase occurred in manufactured intermediate inputs. In contrast, in Korea and
Malaysia, two newly  industrializing countries (NICs) in which the level  of education is
widely perceived to have been an important contributor to industrial growth, the level of
imports was rising very rapidly, reflecting the growth in export earnings, and the share of
the two technology embodying inputs was constant or increasing, implying potential for
significant returns from the ability to effectively utilize the new technology component of
these imports.
There was also a dramatic change in sectoral structure in the Asian NICs compared
to  the  sectoral  stagnation  of  the  Afirican nations.  Table  2  shows  the  distribution  of
manufacturing value added among light and heavy manufacturing for the five countries in
question  and  an  index  of  structural  change  given  by  the  standard  deviation  of  the
percentage change between 1980 and 1990 in value added, calculated over all three digit
industrial sectors. As can be  seen, both the sectoral distribution between heavy and light
and the summary standard deviation measure, show that the three African economies have
experienced relatively little change in the structure of sectoral production, a phenomenon
also replicated  at the firm level.  The firms in our sample manufacture relatively  simple
products and it is unlikely that the internal product mix of firms has changed much. Indeed,
many of the items produced by the larger firms are not that different from those fabricated
in the informal sector.
disaggregated  breakdown  of imports  that  would  allow  more precision  with  respect  to the both equipment  and
intermediate  imports. However,  the latest date for which these are available  for the African econornies  is
1990, two years before the firm-level surveys  were carried out. Thus we have cited the aggregate  data
generated  by the World  Bank.
6 The greater  summary  measure  in Zimbabwe  compared  to Ghana  and Kenya  is largely  due to the
expansion  in the share  of the beverage  sector,  a branch  in which  the technology  employed  has not changed.
5Table 2. Sectoral Distribution of Value Added in Manufacturing
Ghana  Kenya  Zimbabwe  Korea  Malaysia
1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990
Light industry 57.8  59.9  52.7  55.2  49.3  53.3  41.5  29.6  47.8  30.8
Heavy mdustry  42.2  40.1  47.2  45.1  50.7  46.7  58.5  70.4  52.2  69.2
SDofthe%  1.58  1.25  2.05  2.18  2.98
change
Source: IJNIDO (1993).
These results suggest that unless some firms were able to deviate from the overall
pattern of stagnation of new inputs, it would be surprising if firms with higher technical
skills realized greater levels of productivity.
4.  Empirical Results at the Firm Level
A. The  data
We analyze the relationship between skills and production  costs using firm-level
data from three African countries, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Ghana. The survey data were
collected  in  1993 (for Kenya  and Zimbabwe)  and  1992 (for  Ghana)  by  the  Regional
Program on Enterprise Development of the World Bank. Although the data  are by now
panel data, with up to three years of infornation  for each firm, only the first year of data
was available for this study. The surveys for each country used similar questionnaires and
sampling procedures. All collect information on the value of output, production costs, the
skill level of the owners and managers in each firm, and each firm's involvement in foreign
markets, such as raw material imports, exports, and foreign ownership.
The Kenyan data are drawn from a survey of 223 manufacturing firms. The original
sample consists of 162 formal sector firms drawn from the Central Bureau of Statistics
register of firms, and 61 informal (i.e., nonregistered) firms. Four sectors are represented:
food processing,  textiles and garments, woodworking, and metalworking. The sample is
stratified by sector and (for formal firms) by firm size. Detailed information on the survey
design and the procedures used to compute sampling weights are in World Bank (1993b).
Although the descriptive statistics presented below make use of data on all 223 firms, we
had to exclude 51 firms when estimating cost functions, because of missing or incomplete
data on costs, output, capital values, and other variables used in the analysis.
In Zimbabwe, 201 firms were surveyed in the summer of  1993.  The firms were
selected from two sources. Large firms, with 50 or more employees, were drawn from  a
Firmn  Registration List provided by  the  Central Statistical  Office.  Smaller  firms  were
drawn from a list compiled by the Gemini Survey of small-scale firrns, conducted in 1991.
(See World Bank  1994 for further details on the sample design and the sample weighting
6procedure.)  We use  data  on  200 finns  (one  firm had  no  sector  information and  was
excluded),  and  lose  an  additional  30 firms  for the  estimates of  cost  functions due  to
missing data.
The sample from Ghana consisted of 186 firms surveyed in the summer of  1992.
The sample design is described in World Bank (1993c).  The design of the survey appears
to  have  been  complicated by  the  fact that two  Censuses, an  Industrial  Census and  a
Population  Census,  yield  inconsistent  information  on  the  numbers  of  small-scale
enterprises (World Bank 1993c, p. 28.)  Because of this ambiguity, we do not use survey
weights, the number of firms in each category,  in calculating the summary statistics that
follow but  the means of all firms. It is thus possible that  our sample statistics may not
accurately reflect the characteristics of the population of firms in Ghana.
The fmns in the Ghanaian sample tend to be smaller than the firms in Zimbabwe
and Kenya. Furthermore, there is no simple definition of "formal" versus "informnal"  firms
as there is for the other two countries. In what follows, we sometimes split the Ghanaian
sample between "large" firms, defined as those with 10 or more employees (as opposed to
more than  50  employees  for Zimbabwean  formal-sector  firms),  and  small  firms.  The
Ghanaian data also have a larger fraction of missing values than the other two surveys. Of
the original  186 firms, only  132 can be used to estimate cost functions. Valuation of the
capital stock of firms appears to have been a particular problem in Ghana, and so we do not
include capital stock in the cost functions: doing so would have resulted in losing 19 more
firms.  The results  for Ghana should be treated with extra caution, because of the small
sample and the selection problems that may result from missing dependent variables.
B.  Descriptive information on the firms
The majority of firms are engaged in producing fairly simple products. In all three
countries the modal product of firms in  the food sector is breadmaking. Garments  and
wooden  household  furmiture are the modal responses  for the textile  and  woodworking
sectors.  The metal  sectors  in  each  of the three  countries  are somewhat more  diverse,
although the majority of sampled firms report metal doors, windows, gates and burglar
bars as their primary products. The picture does not change much in Kenya and Zimbabwe
when sample weights are used to calculate the percentage of firms in the population (and
labor shares) in each activity. 7
Most of the firms in each of the countries are sole proprietorships, partnerships, or
limited liability enterprises, and for almost all of these firms a person identified as "the
7 It should be noted that the use of sample weights together  with small sample sizes can yield a
misleading  picture of the activities  of these firms. For example, the Kenyan numbers indicate that 58.7
percent of wood-sector  workers are in the "miscellaneous"  category that includes "carvings, camping
equipment,  and automobile  trim." This is due to one 70-person  firm that makes camping equipment,  and
which  was given a sample  weight  4 times  the sector average.  Likewise,  the result that 41 percent  of food and
beverage  workers make animal  feed and hay is due to I poultry-feed  firm with 420 workers and a sample
weight  3 times the sector  average.
7owner"i was  administered  a  survey  about  his  education,  experience,  and  personal
background.  Owners  in  each  country were  asked  about  the  highest  educational  level
obtained, and were also asked if they had additional vocational, technical, or (for Kenya
and Ghana) professional training. In each country the majority of surveyed owners had at
least some secondary education, and one-third to one-half of these had extra training  as
well. Without reliable data on the distribution of skills in the populations of each of these
countries it is impossible to tell if owners of manufacturing firms have better-than-average
skills. Data from the Ghanaian Living Standards Measurement Study, conducted in  1988
and  1989, indicate that average years of schooling among people aged 15 to  55 was six
years (Jolliffe 1995), with a lower average for people in older age groups, so it is likely
that  owners  of  manufacturing  firms  have  better-than-average  skills  than  the  working
population.
Owners may hire managers with  skills that  exceed their  own, in which  case the
appropriate measure of skill for the firm may be that of the manager rather than the owner.
Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c tabulate the education levels of "general managers" and "production
managers" for fimns that indicate that they have a manager of either type. The distribution
of education among managers is not too dissimilar from the distribution  among owners,
although a higher fraction of managers have attended a university. However, this does not
imply that owners hire managers who are more educated than themselves, and may reflect
the fact that it is larger firms with more educated owners that hire managers. Among firms
that have both owners and managers present, there is a high correlation between the skill
levels of the two.8 The survey also asks about the average education levels of "managerial
employees." Tabulations of these for Kenya and Ghana are shown in Table 4 (the results
for Zimbabwe were miscoded and cannot be used), and these indicate that the majority of
managerial  employees  have  attended  secondary  school,  and  roughly  a  quarter  of  the
sampled  firms  with  managerial  employees  list  the  average  education  level  of  their
managers at the university level. In the cost functions presented below we use a variety of
skill measures that reflect the education levels of both owners and managers.
Table 3a. Kenya:  Distribution  of Managers'  Education
General manager (N=1  IO)  Production manager (N=58)
None  2  0.1%  1  15.2%
Primary  8  33.4%  3  1.2%
Secondary  47  40.2%  25  57.7%
University  - nontechnical  25  3.4%  5  1.4%
University  - technical  21  17.8%  21  23.8%
Post-graduate  (Kenya)  3  0.3%  1  0.3%
Post-graduate  (abroad)  4  4.9%  2  0.5%
Note: Percentages  are calculated  using survey  weights  based on number  of firms sampled.
8 The survey does not ask whether the owner and manager are the same person, and this might
account  for the similarity  between  the education  of owners  and managers.
8Table 3b. Zimbabwe: Distribution of Managers' Education
General  manager  (N=190)  Production  manager  (N=108)
None  3  2.4%  1  0.9%
Primary  27  42.4%  16  14.8%
Secondary  86  47.1%  49  45.4%
University  - nontechnical  31  3.7%  10  9.3%
University  - technical  31  2.7%  27  25.0%
Post-graduate  (local)  2  0.1%  3  2.8%
Post-graduate  (abroad)  10  1.7%  2  1.9%
Note: Percentages  are calculated  using  survey  weights.
Table 3c. Ghana: Distribution of Managers' Education
General  manager  (N=46)  Production  manager  (N=SI)
None  4  8.5%  0  0.0%
Primary  4  8.5%  3  5.9%
Secondary  10  21.2%  11  21.6%
University  - nontechnical  7  14.9%  2  3.9%
University- technical  18  38.3%  28  54.9%
Post-graduate  (local)  1  2.1%  1  2.0%
Post-graduate  (abroad)  3  6.4%  6  11.8%
Note:  Percentages  are calculated  as means.
Table 4. Average Education of Managerial Employees (126 firms)
Education  level  Total  Vocational  Technical  Professional
Kenya (126  firms)
None  1  0.2%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%
Primary  8  14.2%  0  0.0%  2  8.0%  0  0.0%
Secondary  82  74.2%  7  6.4%  8  14.3%  11  1.5%
University  35  11.4%  1  0.0%  0  0.0%  9  1.6%
Ghana  (64 fmns)
None  2  3.1%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%
Primary  1  1.6%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%
Secondary  45  70.3%  4  6.2%  8  12.5%  14  21.9%
University  16  25.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  2  3.1%
Note: Numbers  indicate  numbers  of sampled  firms.  For Kenya,  the percentages  are calculated  using  weights
provided  by the survey.  The data from  Ghana  are unweighted.
We  have no  direct  measures  of the  rate  at which  different  firns  acquire  new
technology (i.e., the term  PF  in equation 4). However, it is likely that the acquisition of new
technology  from abroad is positively  correlated with  activities in  foreign markets,  and
Table 5 presents information on these activities. The predominant picture is of firms that
have little involvement in international markets. The vast majority of all firms import none
of their raw materials, export none of their output, and do not have any foreign ownership.
The  firms  were  also  asked  about  the use  of  foreign technology  licenses  and  foreign
technical assistance. In Kenya, only 9 out of 220 firms who answered these questions had
foreign licenses, and  17 out of 220 received foreign technical assistance. In Zimbabwe
licenses and technical assistance were somewhat more common: 28 out of 200 firms has
foreign licenses and 26 out of 200 received technical assistance. The questions asked of
Ghanaian  firms  were  phrased  differently,  but  also  indicate  little  use  of  licenses  or
9assistance. Of the 186 firms in the sample, only 6 firms indicated that they had held at least
one foreign license during the past  10 years, 6 said they had received foreign technical
assistance in the last year, and 2 said they had used foreign consultants in the past 2 years.
Table 5. Involvement  in Foreign  Markets
None  0-25%  25%-50%  50%-75%  75%-100%
Kenya
Percentage  of raw materials  121  32  15  25  25
Imported  (76.1%)  (11.4%)  (3.3%)  (3.3%)  (5.9%)
Percentage  of output  exported  170  29  7  4  8
(78.0%)  (6.6%)  (0.1%)  (0.2%)  (0.3%)
Percentage  of foreign  184  4  6  10  14
Ownership  of the firm  (96.5%)  (0.2%)  (1.7%)  (0.3%)  (1.3%)
Zimbabwe
Percentage  of raw materials  92  57  20  13  12
Imported  (93.0%)  (4.4%)  (0.9%)  (0.4%)  (1.3%)
Percentage  of output  exported  104  58  23  9  6
(92.2%)  (4.4%)  (1.1%)  (1.1%)  (1.3%)
Percentage  of foreign  155  12  7  8  15
Ownership  of the firm  (96.7%)  (0.5%)  (0.6%)  (0.9%)  (1.3%)
Ghana
Percentage  of raw  materials  127  12  6  11  19
Imported  (72.6%)  (6.9%)  (3.4%)  (6.3%)  (10.9%)
Percentage  of output  exported  163  11  2  1  4
(90.1%)  (6.1%)  (1.1%)  (0.6%)  (2.2%)
Percentage  of foreign  154  2  12  13  5
Ownership  of  the  firm  (82.8%)  (1.1%)  (6.5%)  (7.0%)  (2.7%)
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of finms. The percentages for Kenya and Zimbabwe
are calculated  using survey  weights.  The percentages  for Ghana  are unweighted.
C. Estimates of cost functions
The data described above have been used to estimate cost functions for firms in
each of the three countries. Our primary interest is to see whether firms with more skills
(as measured by the education levels of owners and/or managers) and more involvement in
foreign markets have lower productions costs, given output. We start with the short-run
cost function for firm i:
(5)  Ci =  C (pi,  ki,  qi /Ad),
where  c is costs defined as the cost of labor, raw materials, and  indirect costs such as
utilities and rent, p is a vector of input prices, q is the value of output, k is the replacement
value of the firm's capital equipment, and A is a measure of the technology level of the
firm.  This  form  of  the  cost  function  follows  from  the  assumption  that  the  short-run
production function has the fornn qi = AiQ(Mi,  k), where Mi is a vector of variable inputs
and Ai depends  on the level  of  "technological" inputs  such  as education.  The Nelson-
Phelps view discussed in Section 2 implies that Ai is a function of both the skill level of the
firm (measured by hi) and also by factors that affect the firm specific rate of flow of new
10technologies  from  abroad  (measured  by  (PF),  the  two  entering  the  cost  function
interactively.
We start by estimating basic cost functions that do not include any variables that
may affect Ai. Because we have small samples of cross-sectional data, and no data on input
prices p, we employ simple specifications for the short-run cost functions. We work with
the following:
(6)  ln(ci) - /3  + a, ln(qi)  +  aq,,[hn(qi)] 2 +  zk ln(ki)
()kk[ln(kd)] 2 +  aqk ln(qi)ln(ki)  +  s;,
where I3, is a sector-specific intercept meant to capture the effects of differences in input
prices across  sectors. As  discussed above, the data from  Ghana contain  many missing
values for the value of capital, and so for it the terms in (6) that involve the logarithm of
capital are excluded. Estimates of these basic cost functions are shown in Table 6. The top
panel shows estimates for formal firms (or, in the case of Ghana, firms with  10 or more
employees), and the bottom panel shows results for the full set of firms. The estimates for
the three countries are quite similar, and are also similar for the formal and full samples. In
all specifications the sectoral dummy variables are jointly insignificant. 9 The results for the
simplest specification, in which the logarithm of costs is regressed  on the logarithm of
output and a set of sector dummies, indicate that the underlying production technology
displays constant or slightly increasing returns to scale. Variation in output explains a high
fraction of variation in costs, with R  's that exceed 0.92 for all countries. Including the
logarithm of output squared, the measures of capital, and the interaction of  capital and
output does not greatly improve the fit of the cost functions.
The cost function shown in equation (6) was modified to include variables that are
likely  to  affect A. As discussed  above, A is meant  to  capture  the effects of  skills  and
determinants of technology inflows on costs. We begin by including measures of the skill
level of firm's owners or, if no owner was present, the skill level of the firm's manager. For
Kenya and Ghana, the education levels of owners and the average education of managerial
employees was coded in the same way, and we construct dummies that indicate whether
the owner  (or managerial  employees)  had no  schooling, primary  schooling,  secondary
schooling, or university training. We also experimented with using more finely detailed
educational categories that made use of the information on whether owners/employees had
received  occupational  or  vocational training.  These  results  are not  reported,  but  were
essentially  no  different  than  the results  that  are  discussed below.  For  Zimbabwe  the
variable pertaining to the average education of managerial employees was miscoded, and
so for firms without owners we substitute the education level of the general manager or, if
there  was  no  general  manager,  the  production  manager.  There  are  only  3  firrns  in
9 We also experimented with including dummy variables for the city in which frms  are located, and
these  were  also  insignificant. The  results  are  consistent  with  there  being  neither  regional  nor  sectoral
variation in input prices.
11Zimbabwe with owner/managers with no education, and so we combine the "no schooling"
and "primary education" categories. For all countries, we experimented with altering the
definition of "skills"  in a variety of ways, for example by using the education level of
managerial  employees and only using the owner's education if no managerial  employees
were present. Doing so had no effect on the results.
Table 6. Basic Cost Functions  For Formal  Sector  Firms  or (For Ghana)  Large  Firms
(absolute  values  of t-statistics  in parentheses)
Kenya  Zimbabwe  Ghana
Wood  -0.11  -0.09  -0.23  -0.22  -0.32  -0.32
(0.92)  (0.70)  (1.55)  (1.60)  (1.58)  (1.56)
Textiles  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  -0.04  -0.18  -0.15
(0.23)  (0.20)  (0.08)  (0.38)  (0.96)  (0.79)
Metal  0.06  0.04  -0.02  -0.01  -0.18  -0.19
(0.48)  (0.32)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.95)  (0.98)
In(q)  0.915  0.75  0.88  0.42  1.00  1.33
(44.94)  (5.68)  (43.20)  (3.87)  (27.10)  (6.45)
ln(q)  2  0.02  0.05  -0.022
(1.57)  (1.90)  (1.64)
hn(k)  0.24  0.37
(1.65)  (3.65)
In(k)
2 -0.01  -0.01
(0.70)  (.73)
In(q)ln(k)  -0.01  -0.02
(.43)  (0.36)
Obs  125  125  142  142  80  80
1(2  .95  .95  .93  .94  .93  .93
Full sample  offirms
Formal  0.35  0.28  0.32  0.31  0.12  0.10
(3.56)  (2.15)  (2.40)  (2.26)  (0.72)  (0.65)
Wood  -0.18  -0.17  -0.11  -0.06  -0.14  -0.11
(1.59)  (1.50)  (0.83)  (0.51)  (0.73)  (.55)
Textiles  -0.10  -0.09  0.04  0.03  -0.14  -0.11
(0.85)  (0.79)  (0.42)  (0.27)  (0.77)  (0.63)
Metal  -0.08  -0.09  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.02
(0.70)  (0.79)  (0.56)  (0.30)  (0.09)  (0.12)
In(q)  0.90  0.78  0.89  0.69  1.109  1.19
(47.93)  (9.94)  (46.29)  (9.46)  (25.78)  (8.21)
In(q)  2  0.022  0.06  -0.01
(2.03)  (3.06)  (1.17)
ln(k)  0.10  0.13
(1.54)  (2.69)
ln(k) 2 0.003  0.016
(0.33)  (1.42)
ln(q)ln(k)  -0.02  -0.06
(1.11)  (2.09)
Obs  172  172  170  170  132  132
1(2  .96  .96  .96  .96  .92  .92
12The first columns of Tables  7a, 7b and 7c show estimates  of cost functions  when
the "skill"  measures  are included.  As the coefficients  on the variables  shown in Table  6 are
largely unchanged,  only coefficients  for the skill variables are reported. The results are
easily sunmmarized.  In no country  are higher managerial  skills  associated  with lower costs,
given output. There is one anomalous  result for formal sector firms in Ghana (Table 7c):
firms with educated owners appear to have higher costs than those with no education.
However,  the three educational  dummy  variables  are not  jointly significant.
In  the  second column of  the three tables we include variables that measure
involvement  in foreign  markets:  the percentage  of raw materials  imported, the percentage
of  output exported, and  the  percentage of  foreign ownership. If  firms with  more
involvement  in foreign markets have more access to lower-cost technology,  then these
variables should  be negatively  correlated  with costs. However,  interpreting  the parameter
estimates  requires  caution:  it could  be that finns whose costs are initially  lower  export  their
output. This could also produce a negative correlation  between exports and costs, and it
would  be incorrect  to interpret  the results  as reflecting  the effects  of the rate of technology
transfer on costs (Clarides,  Lachs, and Tybout 1999).10  However, the results indicate that
there is no correlation  between involvement  in foreign  markets and costs in any of the
countries, and the hypothesis  that the variables are individually  and jointly insignificant
cannot be rejected. The lack of  a  statistically significant relationship between these
variables and costs may not be surprising given that very few of the firms have any
involvement  in foreign  markets.
If only high-skill  firms  are able to take advantage  of new technologies  from abroad,
the Nelson-Phelps  view, there should be a negative correlation between costs and an
interaction  term between skills and the variables  reflecting  access to foreign markets.  The
third column of Tables 7a, 7b and 7c show estimates of  cost functions when these
interactions  are included.  Overall,  the results  provide very little support  for the hypothesis
that high skills combined  with access  to foreign  markets result in reductions  of unit costs.
With only one exception, the coefficients on these interactions are insignificant. The
exception is for Kenya, for which firms with university-trained  owner/managers  who
export higher fractions  of their output have lower costs, all else being equal. One should
not, however,  make too much of this finding.  First, there are only 17 formal sector and I
informal sector firms with university-trained  owner/managers  who export any of their
output. Second,  as discussed  above,  without  better information  on exogenous  determinants
of  access to export markets, it is not possible to know whether low-cost firms with
educated  owners  are better equipped  to sell their output abroad,  or whether involvement  in
foreign markets makes it easier for more educated owners to produce using lower-cost
methods.
10  One of the benefits of panel data would be the ability to address the question of whether efficient
firms select into exports or whether exporting generates learning.
13Table 7a. Formal Firms, Kenya
(Obs=125)
Firms  Sample means
Owner/manager's  education:
Primary school  -0.038 (0.32)  -0.017 (0.15)  -0.053 (0.45)  0.32
Secondary  school  -0.062 (0.47)  -0.065 (0.49)  -0.009 (0.07)  0.18
University  -0.056 (0.47)  -0.041 (0.33)  0.032 (0.23)  0.31
% raw materials  imported  0.0006  (0.46)  0.0000  (0.04)  26.8
%output  exported  -0.0034 (1.78)  0.0014  (0.59)  8.9
%foreign  ownership  -0.0019(1.16)  0.0001 (0.04)  10.2
owner/manager  education  is
university  times:
%raw  material  imported  0.0010  (0.43)  16.5
%output  exported  -0.0115 (3.20)  4.3
%foreign  ownership  -0.0023 (0.72)  6.5
R2 0.95  0.95  0.96
Kenya:  allfirms (obs=1  72)
Owner/manager's  education:
Primary  school  -0.054 (0.56)  -0.034 (0.35)  -0.042 (0.42)  .31
Secondary  school  -0.005 (0.05)  0.004  (0.03)  0.033  (0.26)  .15
University  0.016  (0.15)  0.039  (0.34)  0.076  (0.60)  .24
% raw  materials  imported  0.0000  (0.02)  -0.0008 (0.47)  22.3
%output  exported  -0.0026 (1.26)  0.0027  (1.09)  6.5
%foreign  ownership  -0.0020 (1.27)  -0.0021 (0.84)  8.2
owner/manager  education  is
university  times:
%/oraw  material  imnported  0.0017  (0.74)  12.4
%output  exported  -0.0123 (3.33)  3.1
%foreign  ownership  0.0011  (0.32)  5.3
R  2  0.96  0.96  0.97
Note:  Absolute  values  of t-statistics  in parentheses.  Also included  in cost functions  were the logarithms  of
output  and capital,  each of these  terms squared,  and an interaction  term  between  output and capital.
14Table  7b. Formal  Firms,  Zimbabwe
(obs=142)
Firms  Sample means
owner/manager's  education:
secondary  school  0.0216  (0.15)  .0107  (0.08)  -0.041 (0.29)  .48
university  -0.0373  (0.25)  -0.0321 (0.21)  0.102  (0.63)  .42
% raw  materials  imported  0.0004  (0.24)  0.0024  (1.19)  19.2
%output  exported  0.0030  (1.46)  0.0033  (1.33)  13.0
%foreign  ownership  0.0011  (0.80)  0.0032  (1.62)  14.0
owner/manager  education  is
university  times:
%raw  material  imported  -0.0044 (1.50)  8.7
%output  exported  -0.0025 (0.61)  5.7
%foreign  ownership  -0.0041 (1.58)  8.0
R2 0.95  0.95  0.95
Zimbabwe:  all finrs (obs=170)
owner/manager's  education:
secondary  school  0.0500  (0.44)  0.0376  (0.33)  0.0008  (0.01)  .46
university  -0.0256 (0.20)  -0.0204 (0.16)  0.1104  (0.77)  .37
% raw materials  imported  0.0005  (0.33)  0.0025 (1.21)  16.0
%output  exported  0.0031  (1.48)  0.0034 (1.37)  11.5
%foreign  ownership  0.0012  (0.86)  0.0030  (1.50)  11.8
owner/manager  education  is
university  times:
%raw  material  imported  -0.0043 (1.45)  7.2
%output  exported  -0.0023 (0.56)  4.8
%foreign  ownership  -0.0037 (1.36)  6.7
R 2 0.96  0.96  0.97
Note: Absolute  values  of t-statistics  in parentheses.  Also  included  in cost functions  were the logarithms  of
output  and capital,  each of these  terms squared,  and an interaction  term  between  output and  capital (as in
Table 6.)
15Table 7c. Large Firms, Ghana
(10 or more employees) (obs=80)
Firms  Sample means
owner/manager's  education:
primary  school  0.043  (0.22)  0.038  (0.19)  0.044 (0.22)  .39
secondary  school  -0.087 (0.42)  -0.091 (0.44)  -0.135 (0.61)  .33
university  0.427  (1.71)  0.426  (1.70)  0.340  (1.22)  .16
% raw  materials  imported  -0.0006 (0.29)  -0.0041 (1.29)  20.0
%output  exported  -0.0023 (0.78)  -0.0034  (0.77)  6.7
%foreign  ownership  0.0044  (1.36)  0.0099  (1.71)  10.6
owner/manager  education  is
university  times:
%raw  matenal  unported  0.0059  (1.40)  11.5
%output  exported  0.0022 (0.38)  3.7
%foreign  ownership  -0.0070 (1.14)  6.6
R'  0.93  0.93  0.94
Ghana:  all fimns  (obs=132)
owner/manager's  education:
primary  school  0.389  (2.29)  0.386  (2.24)  0.389  (2.23)  .45
secondary  school  0.216  (1.16)  0.215  (1.15)  0.190  (0.96)  .27
university  0.526  (2.12)  0.519  (2.07)  0.465  (1.72)  .11
% raw materials  imported  -0.0002 (0.09)  -0.0019 (0.57)  12.8
%output  exported  -0.0027 (0.75)  -0.0038 (0.72)  4.0
%foreign  ownership  0.0027  (0.80)  0.0045  (0.92)  7.2
owner/manager  education  is
university  times:
%raw  material  imported  0.0035  (0.75)  7.1
%output  exported  0.0024  (0.35)  2.3
%foreign  ownership  -0.0037 (0.54)  4.0
R2  0.92  0.92  0.92
Note:  Absolute  values of t-statistics  in  parentheses.  Also  included  in cost  finctions were the logarithm  of
output and the logarithm  of output squared  (as in Table  6.)
5.  Interpretation  of the Results
There are a number of potential explanations for the absence of significance of the
components of technological ability (A) in countries in which it is generally believed that a
constraining  factor  is  human  capital  and  technological  infrastructure.  Consider  the
specification  that assumes the components of A are multiplicative elements in  the cost
function. First, the relatively non-competitive environment may lead to limited efforts to
utilize those skills that are present. Second, even where skilled managers are present or
R&D  takes place,  these  may simply be  devoted  to  efforts  to  redress  the productivity
depressing  effects imposed  by  the protectionist  regimes.  For  example, engineers  may
spend their time adjusting equipment to cope with low quality intermediate inputs that are
locally available. While this may lead to higher productivity than in their absence, they are
mainly redressing the productivity depressing effects of policy and the net effect of their
effort is likely to be small.
16Surveys  of  firms  in  Africa  repeatedly  find  that  firms  frequently  encounter
difficulties  with  arbitrary  foreign  exchange allocations, zoning,  building  and  licensing
codes,  and  uncertain quality  of  telecommunications and  electricity.  For  exarnple,  the
surveys discussed in this paper indicate that the availability of foreign exchange is a special
problem among formal sector firms. In Kenya, 35.4 percent of firms indicate having "very
severe problems" regarding delays in obtaining foreign exchange, and 41.6 percent report
very  severe problems in foreign exchange availability. Of formal firms in Zimbabwe, 27
percent of firms report very severe problems with delays in obtaining foreign exchange and
52.1 percent  report very severe problems with foreign exchange availability. Reports of
problems  with  infrastructure  are  also  common.  With  such  a  large  set  of  government
imposed handicaps affecting them, it would be  surprising if their technological abilities,
however, measured, would reveal themselves in a systematic fashion across firms. Some
companies may use  technologists to  address regulations,  some to  correct  infrastructure
deficiencies as in Nigeria (Lee et al. 1990) and others to improve productivity. Only after
liberalization  are  the  benefits  from  improved  technological  capacity  likely  to  be
measurable and lead to a significant reduction in costs.
The firms in our sample have not been challenged by newer technologies where the
payoffs to domestic skills are likely to be largest. Simultaneously the failure of agricultural
productivity to grow has limited the economy-wide growth in per capita income. Thus the
change in sectoral structure engendered by different income elasticities among industrial
goods has not had an effect. The absence of a need to alter production methods or sectoral
mix has reduced the payoff to education.
Even if there were an inflow of technology and high education made its absorption
potentially productive, the absence of a competitive environment limits these gains. Much
of the empirical testing of the role of education in adjusting to technical change has been in
the agricultural sector which is usually much more competitive than the industrial sector,
particularly  in  developing  countries (see  the references  in footnote  3.)  In  contrast, in
Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe the survival environment is lax. Tariffs and quotas protect
industrial firms from external competition while internal rivalry is reduced by the relatively
small number of firms producing a specified product. The shift in short-run supply curves
induced  by  abnormal profits  in  competitive markets is  not  forthcoming  as there  are  a
limited number of firms capable of entering most industries. Firms possessing technical
abilities  may choose  not  to  utilize them to  increase productivity  or reduce  costs.  The
abilities of skilled personnel may be devoted to insuring the existence and exploitation of
profit possibilities made possible by tariffs, quotas, and cheap credit.
Firm-level  efforts  to  improve  productivity  are  the  result  of  an  income  and  a
substitution effect. High levels of protection, ceteris paribus, increase the firm's profits per
unit of effort. If the foregone "leisure" or easy life is a normal good, protection will tend to
reduce  cost  saving  efforts.  However, higher levels  of  effective protection  increase  the
opportunity  cost of foregoing additional output from productivity augmenting activities.
Thus,  the impact of firm-level abilities on productivity in  the presence of protection  is
ambiguous. An absence of  an association between  firm skills, however  measured,  and
productivity  levels among firms is not an indication that such skills do not provide the
17potential to raise productivity. Rather, such a capacity may not be deployed in pursuit of
greater cost reduction rather than the search for greater rents or an easier life.
6. Conclusions
The absence  of  a  significant private  payoff  to  technological capability  may  be
surprising  given the  frequently heard statement that  the binding  constraint  on African
industrial development is an insufficient supply of technologically capable manpower. This
is also the implication of the many cross-country studies that find that an important source
of low growth in per capita income in Africa is the low level of human capital, however
measured.  Our results  are not  necessarily  in  conflict with  this  view.  They  should  be
interpreted as indicating that in non-competitive industrial sectors with very little inflow of
new technology, the contribution of technological abilities, however measured, is limited.
If there were a liberalization of the economy that generated greater competition or if there
were  an  acceleration  of  export  growth,  permitting  the  import  of  new  technology
embodying inputs, the contribution of local skills would become more significant in raising
output. The experience of other countries also suggests that as the economy becomes open
to flows of international knowledge, whether through informal transfers from purchasers of
exports  or  through  technology  licenses,  the  technological  capacity  of  local  industry
becomes important. II
The  policy  implications  of  the  empirical  analysis  are  clear.  Absent  greater
prospective competition, continued efforts to develop high-level industrial  skills may be
wasteful. The conundrum is that their absence may limit the benefits to the industrial sector
from future liberalization and lead to a weak supply response to improved incentives.
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